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Passenger Carrier's Liability Extended Beyond Its
Own Line by Ticket Sale TransactionEphraim v. Safeway Trails, Inc.*
Plaintiff, a Negro woman, purchased a roundtrip bus ticket in
New York City for travel between there and Montgomery, Alabama.
The ticket was sold by defendant, an interstate common carrier
licensed to do business in New York, and consisted of a strip of
coupon tickets, each good for a separate portion of the journey over
the lines of defendant and other independent carriers. Printed on the
back of each coupon was a clause limiting defendant's liability to
its own line. 1 Defendant received a ten per cent commission on
those connecting tickets it sold for the other lines, and on the
face of those tickets there was the statement that they had been
issued "for the account of" defendant. Plaintiff was assured by
defendant's ticket agent that she would have a seat throughout the
trip. In the course of the trip, after plaintiff had changed buses
to that of an independent line, she was asked by the driver to move
from her seat to one in the rear of the bus in order to accommodate
a white passenger. When plaintiff refused, the bus continued to a
town in Georgia where the driver left the bus and returned with
a policeman, who told her to move to the back. Plaintiff again
refused and the officer ordered her to leave the bus. While she was
doing so, he shoved her and hit her on the head, causing serious
injury. After receiving hospital treatment, plaintiff returned to
New York where she instituted a personal injury action against
defendant. At trial without jury, held, judgment for plaintiff for
five thousand dollars. Although the issuing carrier would not
ordinarily be liable for the torts of a connecting carrier, factors
indicating that the transaction involved more than a mere sale of
a ticket served to vitiate the effect of the exculpatory clause limiting the common carrier's liability to its own line.
About the tum of the century, ·American courts were divided
on the issue of whether an initial carrier who sold a through ticket,2
involving travel on both its own and connecting lines, was liable to
passengers for injuries occurring on the other lines in the course
of the journey. 3 Most courts, however, were in agreement that the
• 230 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), appeal docketed, No. 29064, 2d Cir., 1964.
1. The disclaimer clause read as follows: "In selling this ticket and checking
baggage thereon the selling carrier acts only as agent and is not responsible beyond
its own line and does not assume expense of transfer at any junction or guarantee
any connections."
2. A through ticket is one issued by the initial carrier which is valid to the
destination, even though it is beyond the limits of the initial carrier's line and,
thus, involves travel over a connecting carrier.
3. Compare Central R.R. v. Combs, 70 Ga. 533 (1883) and Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Spurling, 160 Ky. 819, 170 S.W. 192 (1914), with Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co.,
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initial carrier could limit liability to its own line through the use of
a disclaimer clause similar to that used by defendant in the principal case.~ There have been no intervening federal statutory provisions concerning liability to interstate passengers, and this latter
view has persisted to the present.5 Generally, however, courts have
limited the effect of these exculpatory clauses in two instances:
They have refused enforcement of the clauses when it has been
proved that the carriers involved have formed a partnership or
joint venture; 6 and some courts have required that the passenger
have actual notice of the clause for it effectively to limit liability. 7
On the other hand, it has been recognized that a carrier may
contract with the passenger to extend its liability, and when the
existence of such an agreement is in issue, the disclaimer clause is
of only evidentiary value, albeit of considerable weight, as to the
parties' intention. 8
Initially, the court in the principal case recognized the general
rule that the exculpatory declaration on the back of the tickets
would normally be effective for the defendant to avoid liability.9
However, plaintiff contended that the presence of three factors
indicated that the sale of the bus ticket constituted a special
contract, by which defendant itself had undertaken the responsibility of transporting her to her destination. In ruling for plaintiff,
the court adopted these contentions and set out the three factors
as the basis for holding defendant liable despite the exculpatory
provision.
First, the court alluded to the receipt by the defendant of a
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 318, 324 (1872) and Pennsylvania Co. v. Loftis, 72 Ohio St. 288,
295, 74 N.E. 179, 182 (1905).
4. See, e.g., Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929); Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Prude, 265 U.S. 99 (1924).
5. See, e.g., Spears v. Transcontinental Bus Sys., 226 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1955); Solo•
mon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 96 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Morrison v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 6 Fed. Carr. Cas. 2013 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Webb, 248
S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1952). But see Berry v. Pennsylvania R.R., 80 N.J. Super. 321, 193
A.2d 569 (1963), which rejects in theory the validity of the disclaimer clause, although
holding Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Chatters, supra note 4, controlling.
6. See Wooten v. Pennsylvania R.R., 288 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1961); Gates v.
Greyhound Corp., 197 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. Miss. 1960). Similarly, the disclaimer will
not exonerate the initial carrier of its own negligence, no matter where occurring
on the trip. See Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Chatters, supra note 4, at 331; Wooten v.
Pennsylvania R.R., supra.
7. Although it seemed to have been settled by Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Prude, 265
U.S. 99 (1924), that the passenger was bound by the ticket provisions, a state court
has recently held otherwise. Hudson v. Continental Bus Sys., Inc., 317 S.W.2d 584
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958). See Note, 33 MARQ. L. REv. 196 (1950); annotation accompanying the report of the Prude case, supra, 68 L. Ed. 922 (1924).
8. See Morrison v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 Fed. Carr. Cas. 2013, 2014-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1946); Hudson v. Continental Bus Sys., Inc., supra note 7.
9. Principal case at 570-71.
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ten per cent commission on tickets it sold for the other lines. No
explanation of the significance of this factor was offered by the
court. Plaintiff emphasized the fact that defendant derived economic
benefit from plaintiff's travels over the lines of the connecting
carriers, which she felt established some legal relationship similar
to that of a joint venture or partnership.10 In other cases where this
argument has been made, the courts have generally required clear
proof of the existence of a joint undertaking,11 and sharing of benefits is only one of the indicia used in this determination; it is
doubtful that the fact of some economic benefit to one party standing alone is sufficient to establish a joint venture. 12 Moreover, defendant's argument that it was acting only as an agent of the other
line-as indicated by the express language of the disclaimer clause11
-is not rebutted by the receipt of a commission,14 since payment
based on a commission is a normal method of compensation for
agents. And as an agent, defendant would not be liable for wrongs
committed by other agents of the connecting carrier.111 It would
appear, therefore, that unless the payment of a commission is itself
held to establish a joint venture, which seems unlikely, it should
have little significance in determining whether an initial carrier is
liable for the torts of a connecting carrier.
The second factor considered by the court in Ephraim was the
phrase on the face of the tickets that they had been issued "for the
account of" defendant. Again, no reason for the relevance of this
fact was given by the court. It is questionable, however, whether
that language does more than indicate the original seller of the
coupon tickets. By this wording, connecting carriers can ascertain
from whom to collect the portion of the fare attributable to travel
on their lines. Furthermore, it shows to whom these carriers owe
a commission for tickets sold. To ascribe greater significance to this
wording seems unsupportable on the facts of the case.
10. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 14-15, Ephraim v. Safeway Trails, Inc., Doc.
No. 29064, 2d Cir., 1964.
11. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Jones, 155 U.S. !133, 340, 344-45 (1894).
12. Criteria used recently by other courts are found in Wooten v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 288 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1961) (agreement to exchange equipment and personnel and to share dining car liabilities); Gates v. Greyhound Corp., 197 F. Supp.
341 (S.D. Miss. 1960) (contract regarding maintenance, service, and rental charges
on exchanged equipment).
13. See note 1 supra.
14. See Interstate Commerce Act, pt. 2, § 211(a), added by 49 Stat. 554 (1935),
49 U.S.C. § 3ll(a) (1958), which sets out licensing procedures for those who sell
motor carrier tickets for compensation. Specifically exempted from the license requirement, however, are certified carriers who sell tickets on other lines for
compensation when the transportation is to be furnished jointly by these lines, See
also Administrative Ruling No. ll, Bureau of Motor Carriers, Aug. 19, 19!16, FED.
CARR. REP. 1f 25,003 and Brown, Worcester &: N.Y. Street Ry., 4 M.C.C. 701 (1938),
in which the Interstate Commerce Commission has implemented the policy of the acL
15. RF.sl'ATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 358 (1958).
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The third factor referred to by the court in the principal case
concerned the representations made by defendant's ticket agent to
plaintiff during the course of the sale of the ticket. The statements
were assurances that plaintiff would have no trouble obtaining a
seat for the entire trip. 16 Plaintiff did have a reserved seat to Raleigh, North Carolina, where there was a change of buses, and
plaintiff apparently had no difficulty finding a desirable seat on this
second bus. Plaintiff's injuries were not due to a failure on the part
of defendant to provide a seat, but resulted from the unlawful
attempt on the part of an independent company's agent to enforce
segregation on a bus of the connecting line. Plaintiff admitted that
the representations by defendant's agent did not cause defendant to
be an "insurer or guarantor of safe passage."17 Nevertheless, the court
held that this representation, as a part of the totality of defendant's
conduct, subjected the issuer to liability. Other courts, in holding
that certain statements will extend a carrier's liability, have looked
to words in advertisements indicating control of the whole trip by
the issuing carrier, 18 to the use of language by the initial carrier
that "we" have made arrangements with "our men" in other cities
for the completion of a tour,19 and to statements that a specific incident would not occur.20 Seemingly, no case has found a common
carrier liable for injury on an independent line unless there are
facts indicating both an affirmative undertaking by the carrier and
some breach of this undertaking resulting in harm to the plaintiff.
Thus, the principal case, under an amorphous concept of totality
of conduct, creates liability in a common carrier in a situation admittedly otherwise controlled by the exculpatory clause.
The basic policy consideration behind the enforcement of disclaimer clauses is that the initial carrier has no effective control
over the actions of a wholly independent line and, thus, should not
be liable for the wrongs that it could not have prevented.21 It is
only in the area of property transportation that Congress has felt
this policy is overridden by another, more critical, factor. In many
instances, shippers could not ascertain at what point on the trip
16. During the trial the following testimony was given by plaintiff: "I asked him
(referring to defendant's employee at defendant's ticket booth in New York City)
about a reservation for the trip. I told him I wanted to be assured I would get a
seat all the way, because it was a long journey. He assured me I would get a seat
on the bus." Plaintiff's Post-trial Memorandum of Law, p. 4.
17. Brief for Plaintiff-Appcllee, pp. 10-11, Ephraim v. Safeway Trails, Inc., Doc.
No. 29064, 2d Cir., 1964.
18. Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N.Y. 306 (1858).
19. Hudson v. Continental Bus Sys., Inc., 317 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
20. Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Spurling, 160 Ky. 819, 170 S.W. 192 (1914) (plaintiff
would not be delayed by floods); Battle v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., 171 Misc.
517, 13 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (Negro would not be subjected to discrimination during trip).
21. See Louisville 8e N.R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929).
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their goods were damaged. This fact gave rise to an addition to
the Interstate Commerce Act, making the initial or delivering
carrier strictly liable under specific circumstances.22 On the other
hand, the only policy consideration favoring the decision in the
principal case seems to be that of providing a more convenient
forum for the injured passenger. However, the continuous sale by
defendant of tickets for the out-of-state connecting carriers would
seem to be business transactions in New York within the meaning of
that state's recently enacted "single act" statute. 23 Therefore, since
under the new statute a contract consummated within the state has
been held to provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over nonresident parties to that agreement in causes of action for personal
injuries occurring in the performance of the contract,24 plaintiff
should have been able to sue, in New York, the independent connecting carrier on whose line the incident took place,:5
22. Interstate Commerce Act, pt. 1, § 20(11), added by !14 Stat. 59!1 (1906), as
amended, 44 Stat. 1448 (1927), 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1958). This provision is discussed
in Alderson, Connecting Carrier's Liability for Loss or Damage to Shipments, 13
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. !132 (1962).
In Glaser v. Pennsylvania R.R., 82 N.J. Super. 16, 196 A.2d 539 (1963), the
plaintiff contended that the omission of passengers from the coverage of this section
was a legislative oversight which the court should correct. The court, however, rejected the possibility of a trial court effecting such a change in the statute.
23. N.Y. Czv. PRAC. LAw § 302(a): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising
from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner as if he were a
domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he: I. transacts any business
within the state . . . ." See also § 301 which permits a court to exercise jurisdiction
in all situations in which the court could have acted prior to the passage of this
statute.
In Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 182, 250 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct.
1964), the court held that personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant had
been acquired when its agent had confirmed hotel reservations via telephone to
plaintiff in New York. See also Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves, 41 Misc. 2d 186, 245
N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Cf. Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 229 F. Supp.
98 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Muraco v. Ferentino, 42 Misc. 2d 104, 247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct.
1964) (in both cases, the court, in holding that jurisdiction over a nonresident had
not been acquired, cited the absence of a contract made within the state as a
critical factor).
Continuous ticket sales were held to be indicative of "doing business" under prior
New York law in Edwards v. Atlanta 8: W.P.R.R., 197 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.N.Y.
1961); Allegue v. Gulf 8: So. Am. S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Rothenberg
v. Western Pac. R.R., 206 App. Div. 52, 200 N.Y. Supp. 428 (1923); Berner v. United
Airlines, Inc., 2 Misc. 2d 260, 149 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1956), afj'd, 3 N.Y.2d 1003,
147 N.E.2d 7!12, 170 N.Y.S.2d !140 (1957).
24. See, e.g., Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Co., supra note 23, where personal injury
suffered at defendant's hotel was held to be a proper cause of action "arising" out
of the New York contract transaction. See statute cited note 23 supra. See also Tauza
v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 268-69, 115 N.E. 915, 918 (1917), where the court,
per Cardozo, J., held that once the foreign corporation was found to be doing
business in New York, the cause of action need not have arisen in the state. But see
Peters v. Robin Airlines, 281 App. Div. 903, 120 N.Y.S.2d I (1953).
25. The new statute has been held to be applicable retroactively since it is only
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The principal case creates uncertainty in the field of passenger
carrier liability. Since the Interstate Commerce Act provides that
the Commission may establish through routes and joint rates,26
motor carriers cannot escape this extended liability by refusing to
sell tickets on other than their own lines. Passenger carriers are thus
faced with the problem of applying the criteria set out by this
court to their o-wn particular situations and attempting thereby to
measure their potential liability. There are, however, no adequate
guidelines. No indication is given by the court of the importance
of any one of the three factors enumerated, nor is anything said
about their interrelationship. The emphasis placed on the totality
of the factors by the court seems to suggest that all three were
necessary to the decision. Individually, however, none of the factors
is supportable by law as sufficient to vitiate the exculpatory provision of the ticket. It is not clear, therefore, whether the court would
have reached a similar result if only one or two of these factors had
been present.
When a court renders ineffective the recognized efficacy of a disclaimer clause, its reasons for so doing should be explicit. Without
a clearer exposition than was given in the principal case, the tendency will be toward indeterminate liability for these carriers. It is
likely that this will result in an increase in insurance premiums,27
leading to a higher cost of transportation for the public. And though
the initial carrier, or its insurer, may sue the connecting carrier
who caused the injury, 28 the consequent increase in litigation would
seem to offset any policy considerations in favor of providing the
plaintiff with a convenient forum. The situation presented in tpe
principal case should not precipitate a judicial reversal of an accepted trend in passenger carrier liability.
of a procedural nature. Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d
427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
26. Interstate Commerce Act, pL 2, § 216, added by, 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C.
§ 316 (1958).

27. In determining rates for liability policies, the insurance industry relies heavily
on experience. The speculation that is caused by the Ephraim decision would seem
to indicate at least a temporary rise in these rates. Items which would require careful
analysis would include: (1) the number of plaintiffs who return to their home states
to sue the issuing carrier, (2) the changing significance of the territorial classification
previously applied to the initial carrier, and (3) the variance in the loss per unit of
exposure ratio, due to the increase in passenger miles for which each carrier would
be potentially liable. See generally HENSLEY, COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST IN NONLIFE INSURANCE 78-85 (1962) and MICHELBACHER, MULTIPLELINE INSURANCE chs. 5-6 (1957). The effect of insurance on negligence law is discussed
in Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW 8: CoNTEMP.
PROB. 219 (1953), and James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
28. It has been held that the carriers who are strictly liable under 49 U.S.C.
§ 20(11) (1958) have a right to pursue the connecting carrier on whose line the damage
occurred. Keystone Motor Freight Lines v. Brannon-Signaigo Cigar Co., 115 F.2d
736, 740 (5th Cir. 1940). See generally CUSHMAN, TRANSPORTATION LAW 231-32 (1951).

